In fuzzy logic, every word or phrase describing uncertainty is represented by a real number from the interval 0; 1]. There are only denumerable many words and phrases, and continuum many real numbers; thus, not every real number corresponds to some commonsense degree of uncertainty. In this paper, for several fuzzy logic, we describe which numbers are describing such degrees, i.e., in mathematical terms, which real numbers are de nable in the corresponding fuzzy logic.
In commonsense reasoning, we use words and phrases from natural language { like \possible", \reasonably possible", etc. { to describe our degree of certainty in di erent statements. To represent these degrees of certainty in a computer, traditionally, real numbers from the interval 0; 1] are used: 1 (\true") means that we are absolutely sure that a statement is true, 0 means that we are absolutely sure that the statement is false, and numbers between 0 and 1 describe partial certainty; see, e.g., 5, 8, 12] . The correspondence between words and phrases describing uncertainty and real numbers is not one-to-one: in every natural language, there are no more than countably many (@ 0 ) words and phrases, while there is a continuum (@ 1 > @ 0 ) numbers in the interval 0; 1]. From the practical viewpoint, it is therefore desirable to nd out which real numbers are actually needed for describing degrees of uncertainty.
Since one of the main reasons for representing degrees by real numbers is is to represent these degrees in a computer, one possible answer to the above question is to look at which real numbers are actually computer represented. At present, a typical computer-represented \real number" is actually a rational number (= fraction). Therefore, it may seem reasonable to only consider rational numbers { especially since every real number can be approximated by rational numbers with any given accuracy. However, this answer is not very satisfying because sometimes, irrational numbers from the interval 0; 1] are also useful in fuzzy logic. Let us give two examples. These two examples are related to hedges like \almost", \very", etc., which constitute an important part of our reasoning about uncertainty 5, 8, 12]:
A standard representation of a hedge \almost" is that when a statement S has a degree d, the statement \almost S" has a degree p d. Thus, even if S has a simple degree of belief, like d = 1=2 or d = 3=4, the resulting degree of belief for \almost S" will be an irrational number: correspondingly, p 2=2 or p 3=2.
A standard representation of \very" is d 2 , so it does not directly lead to an irrational number. However, indirectly it does. For example, in 6], a \perfect" degree is interpreted as a degree p for which a further \intensi cation" leads to the opposite e ect, i.e., for which \very" p = 1 ? p. For \very" p = p 2 , the resulting equation leads to the golden ratio p = ( p 5 ? 1)=2, which is an irrational number. This number has a lot of uses, so it is desirable to keep it in our set of possible values. These examples prompt us to consider not only computer-represented rational numbers, but also more \complicated" numbers. First, we want to include numbers which can be obtained by an explicit application of standard fuzzy logic operations { like \and", \or", and hedges), so as to cover values like p 2=2.
More generally, we want to include numbers p which are uniquely determined by some meaningful conditions. These conditions can be explicit, equating the number p with a basic expression (like in the above example p = \almost" 1=2).
These conditions can be implicit, e.g., as an equality between two meaningful terms { as in the above example \very" p = 1 ? p. Summarizing these examples, we can say that from all the numbers from the interval 0; 1], we want to use only those numbers which are uniquely determined by some reasonable conditions. In logic, elements of a set which are uniquely determined by some condition are called de nable. In these terms, our original problem of selecting truth values which are really needed can be reformulated as follows: describe all de nable truth values.
In this paper, we formalize this problem, and show how its solution depends on the particular selection of operations in fuzzy logic.
De nitions
Let us rst de ne what a condition can look like. In mathematical logic, formal expressions which describe conditions are called formulas, so we want to de ne the notion of a formula. We will give brief de nitions here; readers who are interested in technical details can look, e.g., in 3, 4, 9].
De nition 1. By a fuzzy logic, we mean a nite set of constants from the interval 0; 1], and and a nite set of operations on the interval 0; 1], i.e., function from 0; 1] k ! 0; 1]. The operations from this set will be called logical operations. For example, constants may include 0 and 1, operations may include an \and"-operation (t-norm) e &, an \or"-operation e _, a fuzzy negation e :, hedge operations, etc. Some of these operations are binary (like t-norm and t-conorm), some are unary (like negation), we may also have ternary operations, etc.
We also have a sequence of variables x 1 ; : : : ; x n ; : : : De nition 6. A set S IR q is called semialgebraic if it is a nite union of subsets, each of which is de ned by a nite system of polynomial equations P r (x 1 ; : : : ; x q ) = 0 and inequalities of the types P s (x 1 ; : : : ; x q ) > 0 and P t (x 1 ; : : : ; x q ) 0 { for some polynomials P i with integer coe cients.
De nition 7. A function f : IR n ! IR is called semialgebraic if its graph f(x; f(x))g is a semialgebraic set.
For example, the graph of the function z = min(x; y) is a union of two pieces of planes z ?x = 0 and z ?y = 0, each piece is described by a polynomial equation (of the plane) and of polynomial inequalities (describing this particular part of the plane): e.g., for z ? x = 0, the inequalities are: y ? x 0 (meaning that x y and x 0, y 0, 1 ? x 0, and 1 ? y 0 (these four inequalities mean that both x and y belong to the interval 0; 1]).
It turns out that for such operations, every de nable truth value x is an algebraic number, i.e., a solution of a polynomial equation a 0 + a 1 x + a 2 x 2 + : : : + a k x k = 0 with integer coe cients a i : Theorem 1. When all logical operations are semialgebraic, then every de nable truth value is algebraic. (For reader's convenience, all the proofs are given in the last Proofs section).
We know that every de nable truth value is algebraic. The next natural question is: is the inverse also true, i.e., is every algebraic number from the interval 0; 1] de nable? The following two results show that the answer to this question depends on the speci c choice of the logical operations. First, let us give an example where every algebraic number is de nable; it turns that this is true for the following Product Lukasiewicz logic: One can see, from the proof, that not only every algebraic number is de nable, but is can be de ned by a quanti er-free formula F(x).
Next, comes an example when some algebraic numbers are not de nable. To describe this example in its utmost generality, we need to introduce a new de nition.
De nition 8. A set S IR q is called semilinear if it is a nite union of subsets, each of which is de ned by a nite system of linear equations P r (x 1 ; : : : ; x q ) = 0 and inequalities of the types P s (x 1 ; : : : ; x q ) > 0 and P t (x 1 ; : : : ; x q ) 0 { for some linear functions P i with integer coe cients.
De nition 9. A function f : IR n ! IR is called semilinear if its graph f(x; f(x))g is a semilinear set.
For example, the text before Theorem 1 shows that the simplest t-norm min(a; b) is a semilinear operation; similarly, the simplest t-conorm max(a; b), the \bold" t-conorm min(a + b; 1), and the bold t-norm max(a + b ? 1; 0) are semilinear operations.
Theorem 3. When all logical operations are semilinear, then every de nable truth value is rational. Since not every algebraic number is rational, we thus conclude that for such logics, not every algebraic number is de nable. The next natural question for such operations is: are all rational numbers de nable? The answer depends on a speci c choice of semilinear operations. First, let us give an example of a logic in which every rational number is de nable; this is true for the so-called Lukasiewicz logic:
Theorem 4. When the set of logical operations includes a e _ b = min(a + b; 1) and e : a = 1 ?a, then every rational number from the interval 0; 1] is de nable.
One can see, from the proof, that not only every rational number is de nable, but it can be de ned by a quanti er-free formula F(x).
As an example of a semilinear logic in which not all rational numbers are de nable, we give the simplest fuzzy logic, for which, as it turns out, we only have three de nable values; this is true for the fuzzy logic consisting of the simplest \and", \or", and \not" operations (this logic is sometimes called a Goedel logic): 
Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. Since all the operations are semi-algebraic, then, for every de nable real number v, the de ning relation F(x) is obtained from a semi-algebraic relation by using quanti ers. According to the famous TarskiSeidenberg theorem 10, 11] (see also 2]), every relation that is obtained from a semialgebraic relation by adding quanti ers 8x, 9x (that run over all real numbers x), is still semialgebraic. Thus, the condition F(x) is itself semialgebraic. In other words, the relation F(x) can be described as P 1 (x) = 0, P 2 (x) 0, etc. for some polynomials P i with integer coe cients. The de nable number v satis es this condition, hence P 1 (v) = 0, i.e., the number v is algebraic. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let v be an algebraic real number from the interval 0; 1]; let us show that it is de nable. If v = 0, then the de ning condition is that x e _ x = x and x < e : x. Similarly, if v = 1, then the de ning condition is that x e _ x = x and x > e : x. To complete the proof, we must consider the case when 0 < v < 1. By de nition of an algebraic number, there exists a polynomial P(x) = a 0 + a 1 x + : : : + a k x k with integer coe cients for which P(x) = 0 for x = v.
We want to \translate" this equation into a fuzzy logic formula.
The rst obstacle to this translation is that in fuzzy logic, we only consider non-negative real numbers, which the coe cients a i can be negative and thus, the value P(x) can be negative (thus di cult to interpret) for some x 2 0; 1]. To overcome this obstacle, we move negative terms to the other side of the equation P(x) = 0. As a result, we get an equality of two polynomials Without losing generality, let us assume that P b i P c j .
Since v < 1, we have v n ! 0 as n ! 1. Thus, there exists an n for which v n P b i < 1; then, v n ?P b i v i v n P b i < 1. Since P c j P b i , we also have v n P c j < 1 and v n ?P c j v j v n P c j < 1. Hence, the desired real number v satis es the following two conditions: P b i x i+n = P c j x j+n and P b i x i+n < 1.
These conditions can already be interpreted in fuzzy logical terms: indeed, We thus get a fuzzy logic condition F(x) which is equivalent to the original polynomial equation P(x) = 0. We are almost done, the only remaining problem is that the equation may have several di erent roots, and we want a formula which is true for only one real number. If this is the case, then we must add, Proof of Theorem 3. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 1. Namely, each semilinear set is a polytope with rational-coordinate vertices. The quanti er 9x i corresponds to projecting this polytope unto a space of one fewer dimension. Once can easily prove that this projection transforms polytopes into polytopes, and vertices with rational coordinates are transformed into vertices with rational coordinates. (This reduction procedure can also be described in purely algebraic terms; see, e.g., 1].) Thus, for semilinear conditions, the condition F(x) is itself semilinear. In other words, the relation F(x) can be described as P 1 (x) = 0, P 2 (x) 0, etc. for some linear function P i (x) with integer coefcients. The de nable number v satis es this condition, hence P 1 (v) = 0, i.e., a v + b = 0 for some integers a and b; hence, the number v = ?b=a is rational.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 4. The proof is similar to the one presented in 7].
We want to prove that every rational number m=n from the interval 0; 1] is de nable. In the proof of Theorem 2, we already proved that 0 and 1 are de nable, so it is su cient to prove that rational numbers between 0 and 1 are de nable; thus, it is su cient to consider the case when 0 < m < n. Without losing generality, we can assume that the numbers m and n have no common divisors: otherwise, we can divide both n and m by their common divisor, and get a simpler fraction representing the same rational number.
Let us prove this result by induction over m. The base is easy to prove: for m = 1, the value 1=n can be de ned as the only value x for which x e _ : : : e _x (n ? 1 times) = e : x:
Let us now prove the induction step. Assume that for for some m, we have already proved the de nability of all the fractions with m 0 < m, and we want to prove that m=n is de nable. To prove it, let us divide n by m < n. Since m and n have no common divisors, we have a non-zero remainder r: n = k m + r, with 0 < r < m. Dividing both sides of this equation by n, we conclude that 1 ? k (m=n) = r=n. Since r < m, by induction assumption, the value r=n is de nable, so there exists a formula F(x) which is only true when x = r=n. To get a formula G(y) which de nes m=n, all we need to do is substitute x = e :
? y e _ : : : e _ y (k times) instead of x into the formula F(x). When G(y) is true, then x = r=n, hence 1 ? k y = r=n and y = m=n. The induction step is proven. Q.E.D.
As an example, let us show how 2/5 will be de ned. 
